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Corporate Law: 
Resolution Triggers for 




One of the great regulatory challenges to emerge from last 
decade’s financial crisis was the problem of “too-big-to-fail” financial 
institutions—those firms whose failure could trigger widespread runs in 
the financial system.  When such firms faltered in 2008, regulators 
faced the dilemma of either acquiescing to financial panic and the 
attendant economic wreckage, or putting taxpayer money at risk to bail 
out the firm and its creditors.  Regulators have made significant 
progress in designing mechanisms to avoid this dilemma.2  This 
progress has, however, primarily centered on what happens once a 
systematically important financial institution (SIFI) is in resolution.  
The lack of robust mechanisms to ensure a SIFI is placed in resolution 
in a timely manner lingers as a major weakness in these schemes.  This 
chapter summarizes the costs and causes of delay in triggering 
resolution and evaluates different approaches to mitigating these costs 
and causes. 
 
The Costs of Delay 
 
Delay in triggering resolution for a bank or SIFI is pernicious 
because losses are likely to worsen at firms with razor-thin or negative 
capital;3 weak firms thus have an incentive to “gamble for 
resurrection,” taking imprudent risks to climb back to solvency, 
confident that the costs of bad outcomes will be borne by creditors or 
taxpayers. 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from John Crawford, Resolution Triggers 
for Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 97 NEB. L. REV. 65 (2018) 
and from John Crawford, Resolution Triggers and TLAC Tradeoffs, OXFORD 
BUSINESS LAW BLOG (2018). 
 2. For detailed analyses of these mechanisms, see John Crawford, “Single 
Point of Entry”: The Promise and Limits of the Latest Cure for Bailouts, 109 
NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103 (2014), and John Crawford, Credible Losers: A 
Regulatory Design for Prudential Market Discipline, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 107 
(2017). 
 3. “Capital” in the banking context, and as used here, refers roughly to a 
firm’s balance-sheet equity—that is, the difference between the value of the 
firm’s assets and its liabilities. 
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To illustrate this dynamic, consider the stylized example of a firm 
whose liabilities exceed the value of its assets by $20, but which has 
not yet been placed in bankruptcy or resolution proceedings.  The firm 
is considering two investments.  Investment A has a 10-percent chance 
of gaining $100 and a 90-percent chance of losing $100; and 
investment B has a 90-percent chance of gaining $10 and a 10-percent 
chance of losing $10.  Investment A has an expected value of negative 
$80; B has an expected value of (positive) $8.  Investment B is thus the 
superior choice from the aggregate perspective of all stakeholders in 
the firm: while it will not return the firm to solvency, it will mitigate 
the losses to creditors.  The shareholders, however, do not bear any of 
the losses in either scenario: because capital is already negative, any 
further losses will be borne by creditors.  Therefore, the expected return 
to shareholders from the two investments yields a different result: The 
expected return to shareholders from investment A is $8,4 while the 
expected value of B is zero.5  The shareholders will thus prefer 
investment A in this stylized example, even though both the probability 
of loss and the magnitude of loss in the downside scenario will be 
much greater.  It is worth emphasizing that the thicker a firm’s capital 
cushion, the less shareholders and managers will be able to shift losses 
onto other claimants, and the less these perverse risk-shifting incentives 
will apply. 
While the example above is highly stylized, the dynamic of 
“gambling for resurrection” was central to the savings and loan (S&L) 
crisis of the 1980s.  Hundreds of S&Ls failed during the 1980s, but a 
large number were permitted to continue operating for extended 
periods—often years—with capital buffers that were razor thin, or even 
negative by some measures.  At the outset of the crisis, trouble arose 
primarily from rising market interest rates, rather than from rising 
defaults by those that had borrowed from the bank.  Rising interest 
rates increased the interest the S&Ls had to pay to their depositors, but 
did not increase the money flowing into the S&Ls from their existing 
stock of assets—primarily long-term fixed-rate mortgages.  (The rates 
                                                 
 4. This is equal to 0.1 * ($100 - $20).  Note that even in this good state of 
the world, the shareholders will need to spend $20 to climb out of their capital 
hole.  The $100 in (further) losses in the event of failure is ignored by 
shareholders in this stylized example: Again, shareholders have already lost 
everything, and, due to limited liability, do not bear any further liability for the 
firm’s losses. 
 5. Even in the good state of the world, in which the investment yields 
$10, this will serve merely to mitigate losses to creditors, and will not fill the 
capital hole of $20.  The equity position of the firm will continue to be 
negative. 
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on these mortgages had been set before market interest rates rose.)  
Measuring assets by what they could be sold for in the market rather 
than with historical accounting methods, many S&Ls owed more than 
their assets were now worth—that is, they were insolvent. 
Regulators, however, permitted market-insolvent S&Ls to continue 
operating, hoping they would dig themselves out of their holes, and 
slackened various rules to permit them to make the attempt.  Many 
S&Ls responded by getting more aggressive (that is, less careful) in 
their underwriting and risk management.  The unhappy result was that 
what started as an interest-rate crisis—one that was partially undone 
once interest rates started falling again—morphed into a crisis of bad 
loans that significantly worsened losses, which were ultimately borne 
by taxpayers.  
 
The Causes of Delay 
 
A bias toward delaying resolution unfortunately seems to infect all 
key actors.  This likely has a variety of causes.  Regulators, for 
example, do not always appreciate the logic behind SIFIs’ risk-shifting 
incentives—after all, these firms surely do not want to lose money.  
Regulators and policymakers might also worry about political backlash 
when the SIFI’s managers and lobbyists contest the finding of 
nonviability.  As former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England Paul 
Tucker has observed, “if faced with uncertain long-term benefits but an 
immediate risk of unpopularity, a policy maker might incline toward 
delaying action until the resilience-eroding threats of exuberance or 
imbalances were widely perceived.”6 
Another set of reasons might be grouped under the rubric of 
“capture”—that is, the excessive identification of regulators with the 
industry they regulate.  Capture can arise from a direct conflict of 
interest, such as when a regulator acquiesces to decisionmakers at a 
firm where she hopes one day to work, or from subtler conflicts, such 
as when a regulator shows “deference to high-status regulated 
executives [or] to those with whom [she] has face-to-face relationships, 
because of empathy or the desire to avoid conflict.”7  While a decision 
on triggering a SIFI resolution would be made at the highest level, 
capture could be a problem even if it affected only lower level 
                                                 
 6. Paul Tucker, The Design and Governance of Financial Stability 
Regimes, 3 ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 48 (Sept. 2016). 
 7. Philip Wallach, What is Regulatory Capture?, THE NEW RAMBLER 
(2015). 
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regulators, if it were to shape the information high-level officials 
received. 
Yet another reason for delay is that the primary measure used for 
triggering resolution—that is, capital—does not always capture the 
“real” state of the bank’s balance sheet.  Market expectation of a higher 
percentage of defaults on a bank’s loans, for example, does not 
necessarily mean that the bank will increase its accounting-based 
provisions for expected defaults or losses in a timely manner.  Thus, 
regulatory measures of capital are “lagging indicators” of trouble at 
banks—that is, there is often a significant lag between trouble 
materializing with respect to a bank’s assets (or the market’s 
recognition of such trouble), and the reflection of that trouble in the 




Several possible reforms could help promote timeliness in 
triggering resolution; this chapter addresses two.  The first is that 
regulators should use market-based measures as triggers for remedial 
actions, up to and including resolution.  A Dodd-Frank-mandated rule 
that was proposed but never finalized would have provided for market-
based triggers for early regulatory intervention, and for the continued 
study and evaluation of such metrics as potential triggers for more 
drastic regulatory actions, including resolution.8  This rule should be 
taken up again and finalized. 
A second reform arises in the context of the “total loss absorbing 
capacity” (TLAC) rules that apply to large bank holding companies, 
requiring them to maintain long-term debt and equity above prescribed 
minimums.  The advantage of TLAC is that it can absorb losses 
without triggering panicked runs—a major risk generated by imposing 
losses on short-term debt.  TLAC plays a central role in efforts to 
facilitate resolution without forcing regulators to face a choice between 
bailouts and panic. 
TLAC’s effectiveness rests first and foremost on whether the 
overall requirements are set at adequate levels.  A related but distinct 
question ties directly back to the issue of trigger timing: namely, for a 
given aggregate amount of TLAC, how much should be in the form of 
long-term debt, and how much in equity?  (Currently the proportion is 
roughly one-third debt and two-thirds common equity.) 
                                                 
 8. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation for Covered 
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594 (Proposed Rule, Jan. 5, 2012). 
2019] The Judges’ Book 51 
Equity has its advantages.  It can absorb losses without implicating 
difficult triggering questions that arise with debt.  Moreover, a higher 
proportion of equity can mitigate perverse risk-shifting incentives on 
the part of shareholders, as captured by the notion of “gambling for 
resurrection,” described above.  A thicker equity cushion operates like 
the deductible on an insurance policy, making a firm’s residual 
claimants more sensitive to the downside risks of aggressive strategies. 
Cutting in the other direction, some observers believe that higher 
debt-to-equity ratios impose discipline on firm managers, helping solve 
a potential agency problem by limiting the free cash flow firm 
managers have to hide underperformance or “benefit taking.”9  Other 
observers, however, have critiqued this view as misplaced in the 
context of banks.10  From this latter standpoint, TLAC shouldn’t 
include long-term debt at all.11 
Even if one rejects the view that debt solves an agency problem, 
there is another factor that counsels against eliminating long-term debt 
as a component of TLAC—and that, indeed, may support higher levels 
than we currently see.  Specifically, long-term debt may help mitigate 
or counteract the delay-inducing factors cited above—especially 
regulatory capital’s lag time for indicating real economic 
developments, and political pressure not to rock the boat.  
Long-term debt’s potential role in mitigating the bad effects of 
capital lag is straightforward: A SIFI should be put into resolution 
when it is at or near the point of insolvency, and capital lag means that 
a firm may be (deeply) insolvent by the time it hits a capital-based 
resolution tripwire.  Regulators relying solely on equity to absorb 
losses in such a case would again face the bailout-or-panic dilemma.  
But consideration of sufficient long-term debt could reveal credible 
loss-bearing capacity beyond the point of (real) insolvency. 
                                                 
 9. See, e.g., Caterina Mendicino et al., Equity Versus Bail-in Debt in 
Banking: An Agency Perspective, European Systemic Risk Board, Working 
Paper No. 50 (2017). 
 10. See Anat R. Admati & Martin F. Hellwig, Does Debt Discipline 
Bankers? An Academic Myth About Bank Indebtedness, Rock Center for 
Corproate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 132 (2013). 
 11. Anat R. Admati, The Missed Opportunity and Challenge of Capital 
Regulation, Rock Center for Corproate Governance at Stanford University 
Working Paper No. 216; Stanford University Graduate School of Business 
Research Paper No. 16-6 (2015). 
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An alternative is to mandate that TLAC be all equity but set a 
much higher threshold for triggering resolution.12  But pulling the 
resolution trigger on a firm when its regulatory measures of capital 
indicate that it is fundamentally solvent is not a politically stable 
solution to the problem of timeliness.  If the resolution trigger is pulled 
when a SIFI loses, say, two-thirds of its equity, the SIFI’s remaining 
(ostensible) capital buffer against insolvency would weaken everyone’s 
sense of urgency and strengthen banks’ persuasiveness when they argue 
against specific triggering decisions.  Even if one could credibly 
remove all regulatory discretion and make the higher equity-based 
trigger automatic, it would be highly vulnerable to bank lobbying and 
legislative rollback.  The fallout of SIFI failure and capital as a lagging 
indicator are complicated ideas; government seizure of an ostensibly 
solvent firm is straightforward and presumably distasteful to many 
elected representatives in the United States.  The resolution of a firm 
that—by regulatory metrics—is insolvent is less likely to invite 
backlash.  Requiring that some portion of TLAC be satisfied with long-
term debt, then, can be understood as a way to force regulators’ hand 
and weaken political and institutional inertia when it comes to putting a 




Timeliness is essential if the resolution mechanisms designed to 
avoid the bailout-or-panic dilemma are to serve their purpose.  
Regulators, however, have not yet paid sufficient attention to ensuring 
timeliness in triggering resolution.  Two reforms could help counteract 
the bias toward delay inherent in the decision to place a SIFI into 
resolution: the incorporation of market metrics into the triggering 




                                                 
 12. See Matt Levine, Regulators Want Banks to Rescue Themselves Next 
Time, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 11, 2014). 
